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1 Introduction 
In this chapter we explore the options available to egalitarians confronting  trade-offs between 
domestic and global equality, paying special attention to some of their respective benefits and 
costs. While there need be no conflict in theory between addressing global inequality 
(inequalities between people worldwide) and addressing domestic inequality (inequalities 
between people within a political community), there may be instances in which the feasible 
mechanisms for reducing global inequality risk aggravating domestic inequality. The burgeoning 
literature on global justice has tended to overlook the latter type of scenario. Consequently, 
theorists espousing global egalitarianism have not engaged with cases that are important for 
evaluating and clarifying the content of their theories. 
Many who endorse policies to promote global equality are uncomfortable with the idea that 
such policies might undermine the living standards of disadvantaged people in their own 
societies. Thus, the  trade-off we consider is likely to be a fraught one for them. We note that 
disregarding the evaluation of difficult  trade-offs is not a sin unique to global egalitarians. Most 
justice theorists who endorse domestic egalitarianism but reject global egalitarianism posit a 
requirement—a duty of justice or of humanity—to promote the achievement of decent standards 
of living worldwide without considering how this requirement relates to their commitment to 
promote domestic equality. 
2 Egalitarian Justice 
Egalitarianism, broadly understood, has long been influential in theorizing about domestic 
justice. With some notable exceptions, justice theorists have repeatedly affirmed that the 
evaluation of domestic institutions should be sensitive to inequalities in distributive shares that 
they tend to generate over time.1 
Egalitarians have, to put it mildly, often disagreed over precisely which conception of social 
justice is desirable. Egalitarian conceptions can be distinguished in terms of the subjects, goods, 
and distributive standards they consider when assessing distributive shares. The subjects of a 
conception of egalitarian justice indicate the subjects among whom equality is to be sought. 
Egalitarian conceptions may, for example, take individual persons as subjects, maintaining that 
there are limits to how steep inequalities in wealth, political influence, or other natural and social 
resources should be between them. Alternatively, they may focus on inequalities in the 
distribution of valued resources amongst social groups (e.g. as defined by gender, race, ethnicity, 
and so on). 
The goods of a conception of egalitarian justice constitute the things to be distributed among 
subjects. Examples of such goods include capabilities and functionings, opportunities, income 
and wealth, economic power, civil and political rights—the last two putting the “liberal” in 
liberal egalitarianism.2 Finally, egalitarian conceptions may differ in the distributive standards 
they employ. An egalitarian conception might defend strict equality as its preferred distributive 
criterion, but few do so.3 Egalitarians need not be committed to viewing all inequalities in the 
relevant goods as wrong or regrettable. Which inequalities stand in need of redress, and to what 
extent, depends on the particular justification invoked in support of these standards. For instance, 
some such justifications might appeal to considerations of responsibility, holding that only 
inequalities due to circumstances, not to subjects’ responsible choices, should be rectified.4 Or 
they may insist on equality with respect to certain goods, but sufficiency or some reasonably 
high level of other goods.5 Alternatively, egalitarians might follow Rawls and conclude that 
departures from equality are permissible so long as they can be justified to those who fare worst 
under them, thereby treating equality as a morally privileged benchmark, rather than a desired 
outcome.6 And, of course, one can be an egalitarian while also embracing other values, such as 
giving some form of priority to concern for the less-advantaged. 
We will refer loosely to all theories that express concern with equality in some way among 
some subjects with respect to some goods as “egalitarian justice.” The literature on global justice 
has to this point focused largely on the scope of egalitarian justice, leaving aside questions 
pertaining to its content. This “question of scope” concerns whether conceptions of justice that 
are endorsed for the domestic sphere constitute appropriate standards on the global plane. 
Two broad camps have emerged in this debate. Global egalitarians (we will call them 
“Extenders”) support extending egalitarian justice to the global level.7 Opponents of various 
stripes (we will call them “Restrictors”) reject any such extension of scope. 8 Restrictors are not a 
cold-hearted lot. Many are egalitarians of some sort domestically, and nearly all of them 
advocate policies and institutional schemes that would likely mitigate inequalities worldwide to 
at least some degree.9 Reforms with global-inequality-reducing effects may be adopted, for 
instance, in pursuit of the humanitarian goal—widely affirmed by Restrictors—of meeting 
people’s basic needs so as to improve the absolute position of the globally disadvantaged. But 
Restrictors deny that inequalities per se are a reason for concern globally, even if they are so 
domestically.10 
Many Restrictors advocate egalitarian justice domestically, so they need to provide good 
reasons why considerations that ground concern with equality within political communities do 
not also ground it globally. On the one hand, they must provide a plausible account of the 
grounds of egalitarian justice. On the other, they must show that these grounds are either not 
present at all or at least not in the requisite degree and form, on the global plane to justify 
concern with global equality per se. 
The debate between Extenders and Restrictors has followed a fairly standard script. 
Restrictors assert that there is an empirical disanalogy between the global and the domestic 
spheres and argue that, in virtue of this disanalogy, restricting the scope of egalitarian principles 
of justice to the domestic sphere is justified. For Restrictors, everyone has certain “general 
duties,” owed identically to everyone in the world. Over and above those, though, people also 
have “special duties” to particular others. Among those are often said to be “associative duties”: 
people who are members of the same association (paradigmatically, family or country) owe 
things to one another that they do not owe to people who are not members of the association.11 
One of the things that members of some associations owe to each other but not to non-associates, 
Restrictors claim, is concern for equality. 
What are the relevant features that associations must have for concern with equality to 
become a requirement of justice? Restrictors have focused mainly on two, cooperation and 
coercion. On the Cooperation Account, concern with distributive equality among some group of 
people is rooted in the fact that members of the group are cooperating in some joint venture. On 
the Coercion Account, concern with distributive equality among some group of people is rooted 
in the fact that members of the group are all subject to the same coercive authority. One can, of 
course, draw on both accounts in developing a conception of the scope of egalitarian justice, 
treating the existence of either or both Coercion and Cooperation as necessary or sufficient 
conditions for its application. Each of these accounts consists of a moral and an empirical 
claim.12 
Take the Coercion Account. The moral claim here is that egalitarian justice only applies in 
the presence of some form of coercion.13 The empirical claim is that coercion of the requisite sort 
is absent at the international level.14 Extenders typically respond by trying to show either that this 
alleged empirical disanalogy between domestic and global with respect to the exercise of 
coercion does not obtain—pointing to the many ways in which coercion of the requisite sort is 
exercised on the global plane15—or that the empirical disanalogy is not morally relevant in the 
way that Restrictors suppose it to be, since coercion is not a necessary condition for the demands 
of egalitarian justice to apply.16 
Two types of Extenders can be distinguished by the form of argument they emphasize in 
responding to Restrictors. The first group shares with Restrictors the view that the scope of 
egalitarian justice is limited to those who stand in some particular kind of social relation with one 
another (e.g. as set out in the Coercion or Cooperation Accounts, or in some other way). These 
“Associative Duty” Extenders, like Restrictors, treat duties to promote equality within some 
group as based on special duties that members of that group have to one another. However, they 
deny that the social relations that trigger these special associative duties are absent on the global 
plane. The second group of Extenders rejects this associationist picture entirely. These “General 
Duty” Extenders deny that the social relations emphasized by Restrictors and Associative Duty 
Extenders really are necessary for egalitarian justice requirements to apply. Extenders of this 
latter sort treat concern with equality as based on general duties held to all, rather than special 
associative duties held only to some. 
3 The Importance of  Trade-Offs in Second-Best Scenarios 
The debates between Extenders and Restrictors regarding the scope of egalitarian justice have 
been valuable; in particular, they have enriched thinking about the grounds for concern with 
equality more generally, and have led to deeper exploration of the nature of global institutions. 
Our aim here, however, is to draw attention to some of the important territory that they have left 
unexplored. 
To provide a glimpse of that unexplored territory: Few Extenders have discussed whether 
any measure a state might adopt to bring about a decrease in global inequality would be justified 
were it to exacerbate inequality within that state.17 One can surely argue that global inequality is 
an important normative concern in its own right, yet maintain that states wishing to participate in 
schemes to reduce global inequality should take special care to avoid measures that aggravate 
domestic inequality.18 Such neglect arises in part from the fact that Extenders typically have in 
view the desirability of a specific kind of  trade-off, namely that between the global rich and the 
global poor. Their advocacy of global egalitarianism typically begins by drawing attention to 
disturbing disparities in shares of global income among different quintiles or deciles before 
considering institutional reforms that would increase the life prospects of those in the bottom 
categories at the cost of decreasing (somewhat) the advantages of those in the top categories.19 It 
is easy to see why Extenders take this route. It is very difficult to absorb these sorts of facts and 
not consider it to be a justice gain were the global rich to have less and the global poor more. 
Indeed, many Restrictors also view this distributive  trade-off as a justice gain.20 However, by 
concentrating on these ideal distributive  trade-offs, Extenders have neglected ways in which the 
pursuit of egalitarian justice could lead to  trade-offs that seem much more worrisome, morally 
speaking. 
As initial motivation for attending to these  trade-offs, notice that these worries are not 
merely academic; they concern many of the policy instruments that social scientists discuss when 
they consider such matters. For example, some economists claim that the best way to do 
something about poverty and inequality is not to engage in redistributive transfers from affluent 
countries to developing countries—this might be counterproductive (at least if provided in the 
form of intergovernmental aid21) and would probably be politically infeasible in any case—but to 
liberalize trade and immigration from poorer developing countries to affluent ones. Perhaps they 
are right. But trade and immigration liberalization are, as policy tools, too blunt to achieve with 
precision the distributive transfers desired by Extenders, namely from those with extremely high 
standards of living to those with very low standards of living. Such measures may instead 
engender aggregate transfers from the disadvantaged in affluent countries to the poor (and not so 
poor) in developing countries. 
One might lodge two sorts of objections to excuse the aforementioned neglect: either that 
these policy prescriptions are misguided—immigration and trade liberalization might do little to 
address global inequality—or that the  trade-offs we have suggested such policies might 
engender would not in fact obtain (e.g. liberalization of both sorts might both help address global 
inequality and promote the well-being of the disadvantaged in developed countries).22 Suffice it 
to say that the empirical questions at issue here are hotly contested.23 Yet it would be surprising 
if some of the general kinds of  trade-offs we have raised—between protecting the interests of 
the domestic poor and promoting global equality—would never arise in considering the different 
policy instruments we might use to address global justice goals.24 Indeed, there are good political 
economic reasons to think that they will arise. 
The well-off in affluent societies typically wield preponderant political power. We can 
reasonably expect wealthy elites to use their power to resist policy reforms that could advance 
the interests of both the domestic and global poor at their expense. Even supposing wealthy elites 
are unable to prevent ostensibly pro-poor policy reforms, it seems reasonable to expect them to 
use their power to manage these reforms so as to capture a sizable portion of the aggregate gains, 
often at the expense of their less-advantaged compatriots. This is not to say that policies 
requiring the very affluent to bear most of the costs of improving the prospects of the global poor 
are altogether infeasible. We simply note that there are reasons to expect that attempts to close 
global inequality gaps will lead to  trade-offs of the kind we raise here. 
Even if one thinks that the risk of such  trade-offs arising is slight, Extenders have more 
principled reasons to consider the kinds of  trade-offs that would arise in second-best situations. 
We will show that how Extenders address such scenarios reveals important aspects of their 
egalitarian ideals. (Extenders are not alone here; Restrictors, too, have overlooked the 
importance of considering the kinds of  trade-offs that arise in second-best scenarios.) 
Ideal theories are often said to illuminate the complexion of basic moral and social values 
(e.g. liberty, equality, community, efficiency, and so on) and the relationships among them, as 
well as providing guidance in our decidedly nonideal world.25 Yet restricting our analysis to a 
narrow range of ideal scenarios—in which at best only a very limited set of  trade-offs arise—
leaves us with an impoverished understanding of basic values. To deeply understand the contours 
of a commitment to certain basic values, we must explore the implications of such a commitment 
across a broad range of scenarios, including those in which a host of desirable policy instruments 
for jointly realizing basic values will be unavailable. Political ideals remain indeterminate to the 
extent that we fail to consider the  trade-offs that arise in such nonideal situations. 
To sum up, both Extenders and Restrictors have typically specified their views in light of 
their implications for ideal contexts, have largely ignored the implications of their views in 
nonideal contexts, and have sidestepped what appears to be important test cases by focusing 
nearly exclusively on the question of scope. This is not just a problem in so far as it concerns the 
application of these conceptions of justice to the real world. It undermines a core objective of 
these conceptions, namely to offer a rich articulation of normative criteria for evaluating global 
distributive schemes. 
4 Competing Claims for Equality 
In what remains, we explore some of the  trade-offs that arise when global equality can be 
achieved only through measures that diminish the position of less-advantaged people in affluent 
societies. Our aim is programmatic: to map certain types of  trade-offs among moral and social 
values that might arise in this sort of scenario and the kinds of ideal moral considerations these 
types of  trade-offs raise. We identify “choice points” for theorizing about broadly egalitarian 
approaches to global justice by revealing the normative commitments that are involved in saying 
one thing rather than another about how to address different types of  trade-offs. The result will 
be a more detailed understanding of the range of views one might hold about global distributive 
justice that are egalitarian in spirit, not just for the nonideal case, but for the ideal case too. As 
we introduce these views, we will also note some of the justificatory challenges they face. 
Consider a world that includes an affluent developed country (labeled D) and an 
underdeveloped country (labeled U). D is marked by nontrivial domestic inequality: the average 
income of D’s elites (labeled YE) is notably higher than the average income of D’s poorest 
residents (labeled YP). Let GD = YP/YE measure the degree of inequality within D (inequality 
increases as GD diverges from 1). We assume that the institutional arrangements engendering 
inequality in D cannot be justified in ways that are congenial to egalitarians—e.g. they do not 
optimize the position of the least advantaged in society and are not necessary to sustain relatively 
high standards of living. This world is also marked by unjustifiable global inequality: even YP is 
higher than YU, the income of typical residents of U. Let GW = YU/YE measure the degree of 
global inequality.26 Given our assumptions, GW < GD (global inequality is greater than domestic 
inequality). 
The status quo institutional scheme in this world, labeled Q, is such that D maintains some 
significant restrictions on cross-border economic interactions (trade, investment, etc.) with U.27 
In contrast, consider an alternative institutional scheme, labeled L, that liberalizes such cross-
border interactions with U. We assume that, if implemented, L would greatly increase YU (by the 
familiar textbook mechanisms). We also assume that implementing L does not decrease D’s 
aggregate income (so L is Pareto-efficient at the country level). However, L does increase 
domestic inequality (i.e., decrease GD).28 To ensure that shifting from Q to L decreases global 
inequality (i.e., increases GW), we assume that YU increases at a greater rate than YE. 
Given this scenario, should the egalitarian ideal imply that L is preferable to Q from the 
standpoint of justice? 
5 Boundless and Bounded Global Egalitarianism 
Ideally, from an egalitarian standpoint, D would implement a tax and transfer policy T to offset 
the losses incurred by D’s less-advantaged residents from establishing L. (Remember that L does 
not decrease D’s aggregate income.) Any broadly egalitarian view affirms that D’s less-
advantaged residents have a reasonable complaint against those who stand in the way of 
implementing T if L is established. At a minimum, the package (L,T) would mitigate global 
inequality without increasing domestic inequality. Egalitarians agree in the ideal case: (L,T) is 
preferable to (L,not-T) from the standpoint of justice. But suppose (L,T) is not feasible (because, 
e.g., there is insufficient political will, D’s elites use their political power to resist, or the 
technology required to implement the tax and transfer scheme is absent). According to the 
egalitarian ideal, is (L,not-T) preferable to Q = (not-L,not-T) from the standpoint of justice? 
Global egalitarians encounter two broad options here. One response says that borders are 
simply irrelevant for settling the requirements of justice. Suppose justice requires us to mitigate 
inequality among a set of individuals, denoted N. Then, the fact that reducing inequality among 
the members of N would lead to greater inequality among a proper subset of N is irrelevant: it 
does not provide a reason against reducing inequality among the members of N. Let us call this 
view “Boundless Egalitarianism.” To provide some contrast, “Bounded Egalitarianism” (more 
precisely: “Boundary Weighted Egalitarianism”) allows that borders may constitute a salient 
partition on N, such that justice requires us to (in some way) prioritize equality within parts 
before turning our attention to inequality within the superset N. According to Boundless 
Egalitarianism, (L,not-T) must be preferable to Q; Bounded Egalitarianism permits one to judge 
that Q is preferable to (L,not-T). 
Boundless Egalitarianism has the advantage of neatly capturing one of the motivating 
intuitions of global egalitarianism: that all people everywhere are worthy of equal concern and 
respect and that people’s life prospects should not be influenced—at least not unduly—by 
morally arbitrary factors such as race, gender, and place of birth. It is hard to see how General 
Duty Extenders can avoid this position. Boundless Egalitarianism must say that, under the 
specified circumstances, D’s less-advantaged residents have no reasonable grounds to block the 
transition from Q to (L,not-T).29 This implies that the Boundless Egalitarian ideal is ultimately 
undiscriminating when it comes to allocating the costs of increasing equality among the 
members of N. The magnitudes in losses to the disadvantaged in D would not matter, just so long 
as (L,not-T) yields a net gain toward global equality. This may be welcome news to General 
Duty Extenders, but it may also chase a fair few from the Boundless Egalitarian camp. No doubt, 
Boundless Egalitarians can agree that, as far as possible, it is preferable from the standpoint of 
justice to allocate these costs to those who are best positioned to bear them, namely the more 
advantaged members of N. But the scenario under consideration reveals an as yet neglected 
point: Extenders committed to Boundless Egalitarianism are committed to an egalitarian ideal 
that, in principle, places no limits on the subset of individuals who can be required to bear the 
costs of pursuing greater equality among the members of N. 
Those who retreat from Boundless Egalitarianism at this point are left to consider Bounded 
Egalitarianism. Given a set of individuals N and a normatively salient partition on N, Bounded 
Egalitarians say that, all else being equal, inequalities within certain parts of N are more 
worrisome than inequalities within the superset N. Thus, Bounded Egalitarianism offers the 
prospect of reconciling a commitment to weighing domestic inequalities more heavily than 
global inequalities in the scales of justice with the view that (pace the Restrictors) global 
inequalities per se are, nonetheless, important. 
This raises the question of how to weigh within-part inequalities relative to inequalities 
within the superset. Bounded Egalitarians have several options here. At one extreme, they might 
assert a lexical ordering of these requirements. In a weaker form, this lexical ordering could 
demand that policies addressing global inequality be adopted only in so far as they do not 
exacerbate domestic inequality. This would rule out the adoption of (L,not-T) over Q, but might 
permit global-equality-promoting policies that would leave the extent of domestic inequality 
unchanged, even if alternative (and incompatible) policies would increase domestic equality 
without commensurate gains in promoting global equality. In a stronger form, this lexical 
ordering demands that domestic egalitarian goals always take precedence over global egalitarian 
goals. This sort of view would not only rule out (L,not-T), but also any other set of policies that 
would fail to decrease domestic inequality, no matter how large the resultant decrease in global 
inequality. Alternatively, a Bounded Egalitarian view might eschew any form of lexical priority, 
yet still give extra weight to preventing or addressing domestic inequality gaps, all else being 
equal. Whether this sort of Bounded Egalitarian view would condemn or endorse (L,not-T) 
would depend on the magnitudes of gains and losses to the achievement of domestic and global 
egalitarian goals, and the weight that it attaches to each.30 
Bounded Egalitarianism seems to capture a conviction, shared by many, that there is 
something objectionable about radically unequal distributive shares globally (in addition to the 
fact that those with less have so little), while at the same time permitting (or requiring) that 
agents regard unequal distributive shares within their societies as especially urgent concerns—to 
combine a kind of universal concern with associative duties. Perhaps more importantly here, in 
contrast with Boundless Egalitarianism, Bounded Egalitarian views can accommodate limits on 
the set of people who can be required to bear the costs of pursuing greater global equality, 
reserving the heaviest burden for the most affluent. 
Bounded Egalitarians face two justificatory challenges: they must provide some rationale for 
treating a partition on N as normatively salient; and they must provide some rationale for treating 
within-part inequalities as normatively weightier than inequalities within the superset N. 
Associative Duty Extenders seem best positioned to address the latter.31 It is hard to see what 
could motivate differential concern with domestic and global inequality, unless the conditions 
that fix the scope of egalitarian justice admit of degrees. For example, if the conditions of 
egalitarian justice are those set out in the Coercion or Cooperation Accounts, then Associative 
Duty Extenders might hold that the domestic sphere features more thoroughgoing coercion or 
cooperation than the global sphere, and that this provides us with a reason to give greater weight 
to domestic inequality.32 
At the same time, however, attempts to meet the first challenge might leave Bounded 
Egalitarianism at risk of instability. Many of the reasons that theorists have invoked to justify 
concern with global equality may seem to steer us towards Boundless Egalitarianism in 
particular.33 If concern with global inequality derives from the conviction that people’s life 
prospects should not be influenced by morally arbitrary factors, then it is hard to see why we 
should not treat misfortunes due to one type of purportedly arbitrary factor (place of birth) to be 
of as much concern as other such factors (race, gender, etc.).34 And if the conditions fixing the 
scope of egalitarian justice (coercion, cooperation, and so on) are thought of as thresholds, rather 
than a continuum, then this too would drive even Associative Duty Extenders toward Boundless 
Egalitarianism. 
Putting the point differently, Bounded Egalitarians must provide reasons for departing from 
Boundless Egalitarianism that are consistent with their rationale for extending egalitarian justice 
from the domestic to the global plane in the first place. As noted, the most promising attempts to 
justify departures from Boundless Egalitarianism appeal to the kinds of factors that Restrictors 
have adduced in arguing against scope extension (coercion, cooperation, reciprocity, and so on). 
However, whereas Restrictors appeal to these factors to restrict the scope of egalitarian justice to 
the domestic sphere, Bounded Egalitarians must deploy them in a way that renders differential 
concern for domestic inequalities consistent with extending the scope of egalitarian justice to the 
global sphere. Bounded Egalitarians bear a different argumentative burden than Restrictors. The 
latter must show that the conditions that fix the scope of egalitarian justice are not present across 
the full set of individuals N, or not to a sufficient degree. Bounded Egalitarians must demonstrate 
something more subtle: that the conditions that fix the scope of egalitarian justice are satisfied 
across N, but that they are satisfied to a greater degree within certain subsets of N and that this 
differential degree of satisfaction warrants differential concern for the cause of equality. This is 
why the threat of instability looms for Bounded Egalitarians but not Restrictors. To avoid sliding 
toward a Restrictor position, the Bounded Egalitarian must prop up a concern for global equality. 
But the most promising attempts to do so threaten to push the Bounded Egalitarian toward 
Boundless Egalitarianism. 
To conclude this section, we note that our discussion focuses on  trade-offs between 
competing claims to equality “all else being equal.” All else is unlikely to be equal, though—the 
less-advantaged residents of D might bear a normatively significant relationship to the poverty of 
U’s residents. Here, we simply sketch two such relationships, only to set them aside. First, the 
less-advantaged residents of D might have contributed to the vulnerability of disadvantaged 
foreigners, for example by supporting policies that harm their environment or undermine their 
prospects for export-led growth.35 Second, without themselves engaging in any wrongdoing, the 
less-advantaged residents of D might have been unjustly enriched from wrongs that had 
disadvantaged members of U, for example if D and U stood in a colonial relation of some sort or 
if D had engaged in unjust war against U in the past.36 In either of these cases (although the 
second is perhaps more controversial), the relationship borne by the less-advantaged residents of 
D to the disadvantages to be addressed by L might serve to diminish the former’s claim against 
implementing (L,not-T). Nonetheless, the issues we raise here remain important for elaborating 
and clarifying global egalitarian ideals. 
6 Equality versus Sufficiency 
In the previous section, we considered various ways in which an Extender might handle  trade-
offs between competing concerns for distributive equality. We aimed not to advocate any 
particular resolution, but to expose the fact that any assessment of Extenders’ egalitarian ideals 
turns on the resolution of these nonideal  trade-offs, something that has been little noticed among 
global justice theorists. In this section, we show that our assessment of both Extenders’ and 
Restrictors’ ideals is sensitive to the ways in which they might handle nonideal  trade-offs 
between distributive equality and distributive sufficiency. 
To expose the relevant type of  trade-off, we consider a modification of the base model 
introduced in section 4. Recall that there is unjustifiable inequality both within D and between D 
and U. The policy choice continues to be between Q and (L,not-T), with L promising to raise YU, 
the income of the typical residents of U. Let H denote an income sufficiency threshold. We 
assume that the status quo is such that YP > H and YU < H. The question of interest remains 
whether (L,not-T) is preferable to Q from the standpoint of justice. 
 
Modification: Suppose that implementing (L,not-T) holds D’s aggregate income 
fixed and transfers income from D’s poor to D’s rich (again, so L is Pareto-efficient 
at the aggregate level). Hence, adopting (L,not-T) decreases GD = YP/YE (increases 
domestic inequality). While adopting (L,not-T) increases YU, we assume that YE 
increases at a greater rate than YU, so GW = YU/YE  decreases too (global inequality 
increases). We assume that the end result is such that (L,not-T) yields an outcome 
in which everyone achieves at least a sufficient share; hence, H ≤ YU ≤ YP < YE. 
 
In other words, this case raises the following  trade-off. On the one hand, (L,not-T) raises the 
global poor above sufficiency. On the other hand, these sufficiency gains come at the expense of 
both domestic and global equality; indeed, the less-advantaged residents of D bear the burden of 
bringing the global poor above sufficiency. 
This case raises questions for Extenders and Restrictors alike. For Extenders: How important 
is global distributive equality relative to other values, distributive sufficiency in this case?37 
There is a rough consensus among Extenders that claims to sufficiency are more urgent than 
claims to equality. This judgment is typically meant to convey that a duty to realize global 
sufficiency is more stringent than a duty to realize global equality, where stringency is 
understood in terms of the costs one can be required to bear to satisfy the duty in question. This 
judgment is typically made in view of the ideal case, in which the global rich are (often tacitly) 
assumed to bear most of the costs of bringing the global poor to sufficiency. The implicit 
proposal, then, is that the global rich can be required, as a matter of justice, to bear quite heavy 
costs to realize global sufficiency, greater than the marginal costs they can be required to bear to 
move from global sufficiency to global equality. 
Our nonideal case presses Extenders to refine their judgment that global sufficiency is more 
urgent than global equality, perhaps in ways that are surprisingly difficult to reconcile with their 
core theoretical commitments. Does the relative urgency of sufficiency imply that (L,not-T) is 
preferable to Q from the standpoint of justice? Extenders can go either way. Perhaps the more 
straightforward reply is to judge that (L,not-T) is preferable to Q—global sufficiency is, after all, 
more urgent than global equality. Notice that this reply is consistent with driving YP down to H; 
conditions might be such that, to raise YU to sufficiency, (L,not-T) yields YU = YP = H. We 
conjecture that any justification for judging (L,not-T) preferable to Q in view of this possibility is 
likely to be at odds with the egalitarian commitments at the core of the Extender position. 
In Modification, (L,not-T) has a deeply inegalitarian implication: it accepts a highly 
regressive distribution of the costs required to realize sufficiency. The issue, then, is whether 
Extenders can square acceptance of a regressive distribution of costs with the extension of 
egalitarian justice to the global plane. It is no answer, at this point, to simply reiterate the moral 
urgency of relieving the global poor from their desperate plight. The question, after all, is 
whether Extenders’ ideal of justice requires acceptance of a highly regressive distribution of 
costs in exchange for a state of affairs in which the global poor achieve distributive sufficiency. 
Extenders might go the other way and judge that Q is preferable to (L,not-T) from the 
standpoint of justice, for at least a couple of reasons. Perhaps the costs borne by the domestic 
poor are more than justice requires in this case. Alternatively, perhaps there is some income 
threshold between YP and YE, labeled Y*, such that justice does not require individuals with 
incomes below Y* to bear costs for the sake of realizing sufficiency. Notice, though, that both of 
these answers require Extenders to say something more nuanced about the relative urgency of 
realizing global sufficiency than they have said to this point. 
Taking the second rationale first, what is the principle that picks out Y* from among 
(infinitely) many options? We are skeptical that any particular Y* can be given a principled 
rationale. But, setting that aside, we note that Y* cannot be justified by appeal to the relative 
urgency of ensuring distributive sufficiency for the domestic poor—implementing (L,not-T) 
leaves H ≤ YP by assumption. Thus, any principle deployed to justify Y* compels Extenders to 
identify conditions under which (domestic) equality takes precedence over (global) sufficiency 
or to introduce some additional consideration (reciprocity, liberty, and so on). Either way risks 
upsetting the Extender’s rather simplistic normative landscape. (What if the most plausible 
justifications for imposing Y* are in tension with extending the scope of egalitarian justice to the 
global plane?) 
Regarding the first rationale, the domestic poor’s income losses in our nonideal case are 
likely to be far less, in absolute terms, than the income losses Extenders seem prepared to impose 
on the rich in their ideal case. Given this, Extenders might reconcile a preference for Q over 
(L,not-T) with the judgment that justice can require the rich to bear quite heavy income losses 
for the sake of realizing global sufficiency in one of two ways. First, they might conceptualize 
costs in terms of some quantity that has diminishing marginal value in money—utility or well-
being perhaps. Second, they might conceptualize the limit on the costs an individual can be 
required to bear in a way that is sensitive to her income—for instance, no more than a certain 
percentage of one’s income. Both routes seem tenable to us, so our point is not to indicate that 
trouble awaits the Extender who seeks to impose a principled limit on the costs that the domestic 
poor can be required to bear for the sake of realizing global sufficiency. Rather, our point is that 
Extenders have yet to address the issues raised by our nonideal case and that neglecting to do so 
leaves us with an underspecified account of the relationship between basic distributive values. 
For Restrictors, Modification raises questions, not about the relative importance of global 
sufficiency versus global equality, but about the relative importance of global sufficiency versus 
domestic equality.38 Recall that Restrictors usually insist that, while we should not be concerned 
with distributive equality globally, we have a general duty to ensure that all people throughout 
the world achieve a decent standard of living. The question is how this goal fits with Restrictors’ 
concern for domestic egalitarian justice. Restrictors have said little on the matter to this point. 
Some Restrictors address this  trade-off by saying that domestic equality is a requirement of 
justice, while helping people abroad achieve a decent standard of living is merely a humanitarian 
requirement.39 For the purpose at hand, though, it is beside the point whether we treat global 
distributive sufficiency as a requirement of justice or a humanitarian requirement. If it is a 
requirement of justice, then the question is how these two justice requirements relate to one 
another. If it is a humanitarian requirement, then the question is how requirements of justice and 
humanity relate to one another. What matters is the importance attached to these different moral 
demands, rather than how they are categorized. 
One possible way for Restrictors to address this  trade-off claims that domestic equality has 
strict priority over global sufficiency; thus, Q is preferable to (L,not-T) from a moral standpoint. 
This view seems quite extreme. Imagine the feasible set includes two policy options: p1 very 
slightly decreases domestic inequality, while leaving many people far below the sufficiency 
threshold, while p2 leaves domestic equality untouched but raises everyone globally above the 
sufficiency threshold. We submit that the strict priority view bears a heavy burden in justifying a 
preference for p1. 
Restrictors might instead attach different weights to the achievement of these two 
requirements. Plausibly, a justifiable weighting scheme must be sensitive to at least the following 
two parameters. First, following from the last paragraph, the relative weighting of domestic 
equality gains versus global sufficiency gains should accommodate normative judgments that are 
sensitive to the relative size of the two kinds of gains (or losses). Second, our judgments are 
plausibly sensitive to the initial degree of domestic inequality and the initial extent of global 
deprivation. To wit, if GD is quite close to 1 (so YP and YE are nearly equal) and the extent of 
global deprivation is high (many people are far below the sufficiency threshold), this would 
presumably count in favor of adopting a policy that would prioritize the achievement of global 
sufficiency gains rather than domestic equality gains. To be clear, our point here is not that 
Restrictors cannot plausibly address these issues in a way that can be reconciled with their core 
normative commitments (although doing so may be less straightforward than one might hope). 
Rather, our point is that Restrictors have yet to address these issues and, further, that they must 
do so if we are to gain an adequate understanding of their proposed ideals. 
7 Conclusion 
Philosophers often rely on considered judgments about particular scenarios when exploring the 
significance of more general normative principles. For example, if a normative theory you are 
considering implies that bonded or slave labor is permissible when it reduces economic 
inequality, but you find such a practice to be obviously objectionable, this is typically taken as a 
reason to reject the theory. Whether this reason is decisive depends on many other factors, 
including the availability of alternative theories that avoid this particular implication without 
having other implications that are more worrisome. Intuitive moral judgements of this sort—for 
example, that a society that permits bonded labor is seriously unjust—are often spontaneous, but 
they are also objects of reflection and thought. We are inclined to affirm certain general 
principles of global justice in large measure because, upon reflection, they cohere with these 
kinds of judgments about particular cases. 
Of course, one could claim that moral principles do not need to be adjusted to our responses 
to particular cases. One could maintain that, although our judgments about some particular cases 
conflict with what would be the right thing to do according to certain principles, the latter are so 
obviously justified that we have no need to doubt them. But most philosophers working in this 
area have rejected this picture of justification and endorsed some version of John Rawls’s 
method of reflective equilibrium (though often without the device of the original position). 
Roughly, a set of general principles is justified when they cohere with the moral judgments we 
endorse upon reflection.40 The aim is to establish a theory but, at the same time, to retain 
considered judgments as far as possible. If this is the desired manner for developing a normative 
theory, it is important to consider as many cases as possible, since a theory that is consistent with 
firm intuitions in some instances may conflict with them in others. Our aim in this chapter has 
been to introduce a class of second-best scenarios that global justice theorists have neglected to 
this point and to demonstrate the importance of such scenarios as an aid to constructing and 
evaluating ideals of global justice. 
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<CHBM:ENDN>Notes</CHBM:ENDN> 
1 Exceptions include Nozick (1974); Raz (1986); Frankfurt (1988: ch. 11). 
 
 
2 The literature on these topics is vast. Leading early discussions of such goods can be found in the essays 
in Nussbaum and Sen (1993). 
3 For a good overview of some of the options, see Arneson (2002).  
4 See, for example, Arneson (1989); Roemer (1993); and Cohen (2011). Notable critics include Anderson 
(1999) and Hurley (2003). 
5 See, for example,  Nussbaum (2006: esp., 292–5). 
6  Rawls (1999). 
7 Classic early defenses of the Extender position are Beitz (1979/1999) and  Pogge (1989), both of whom 
adopted a broadly Rawlsian approach. More recent statements are offered by Moellendorf (2002); Tan 
(2004); and Caney (2005). 
8  Armstrong (2012) makes a similar contrast between “egalitarian” and “minimalist” approaches. 
9 D. Miller (2005). 
10 Influential expressions of the Restrictor view are R. W. Miller (1998); Blake (2002); Nagel (2005); and 
D. Miller (2007). 
11  Dworkin (1986: 195–206); Scheffler (2001). 
12 One might appeal to something other than cooperation or coercion too. For example, D. Miller (1995) 
grounds a concern for distributive equality in shared national identity. 
13 For example: 
We are required to accord equal status to anyone with whom we are joined in a strong and 
coercively imposed political community ... There is a difference between voluntary 
association, however strongly motivated, and coercively imposed collective authority ... 
Political institutions are different, because adherence to them is not voluntary ... An 
institution that one has no choice about joining must offer terms of membership that meet 
 
a higher standard ... once the state exists, we are in a new moral situation where the value 
of equality has purchase. 
(Nagel 2005: 133; 140)<N-close> 
14 See, for example, Blake (2002); Nagel (2005); Risse (2006). 
15 See, for example, Abizadeh (2007); Barry and Valentini (2009: 495–7); and Ypi, Goodin, and Barry 
(2009). Although his interest is not in justifying global egalitarianism,  Pogge (2008: esp. ch. 4) has 
argued that the global economic order is coercively imposed by the world’s wealthy and privileged on 
the world’s poor. 
16 See, for example, Arneson (2005: esp. 136–42), and Julius (2006: 179–80). 
17 Two scenarios are worth considering. In the first, domestic inequality is increased mechanically, since 
the society has more poor people in it. A policy of immigration liberalization (IL) might mechanically 
increase the number of poorer people in some developed country (D). This could be consistent with it 
being the case that those who were less advantaged in D prior to the adoption of IL are not made worse 
off by the policy (or may even be made better off by it.) In this case, global inequality could be reduced 
and everyone made better off than they were prior to the adoption of IL. In the second, the increase in 
domestic inequality is not merely mechanical, but achieved by an increase in the wealth of the more 
advantaged or a decrease in wealth of the less advantaged in D. (The first type of case exposes some 
interesting fault lines in views on global justice, but we will set aside discussion of such cases here and 
return to it in our discussion of trade-offs faced by Restrictors in section 6.). 
18 This position is hard, if not impossible, to sustain if one is a General Duty Extender. 
19 Pogge (2008); Brock (2009); Hassoun (2012). 
20 R. W. Miller (1998); D. Miller (2005). 
21 As argued, for example, in Easterly (2006). 
 
22 See, for example, Pritchett (2006). 
23 See for example, Borjas (1995), (2003), (2006); Card (2001); and González and Ortega (2011). 
24 Many studies which argue that the effects of immigration liberalization on domestic wages are slight 
focus, reasonably enough, on immigration at historically observed levels. We note that when 
considering the potential effects of very large-scale immigration liberalization from affluent to 
developing countries at present, such studies do not necessarily provide a very trustworthy guide, and 
thus do not obviously support open-borders policies in the way that some of their advocates seem to 
suppose. 
25  Robeyns (2008); Stemplowska (2008); Swift (2008); Simmons (2010); Gilabert (2012); Hamlin and 
Stemplowska (2012). 
26 We will discuss the case in terms of income, but one could replace income by any favored metric 
(wealth, opportunities, capabilities, human rights, and so on). 
27 We bracket cross-border migration so as to avoid the complications brought by dynamic population 
shifts. We also note that our specification of the status quo is consistent with the existence of a network 
of cross-border interactions that is sufficiently dense to trigger normative concern for the global 
inequality in our model among Associative Duty Extenders. L does not represent a shift from no cross-
border interaction to some interaction, but simply a shift to more intense or to different kinds of 
interaction than are present in the status quo. Hence, Associative Duty Extenders should assume that 
the relevant social or institutional features obtain. We wish to explore issues that are in some ways 
distinct from those that divide Associative and General Duty Extenders. 
28 For now, we leave open which possibility consistent with this assumption obtains. As two examples, it 
could be that D’s aggregate income is held fixed but some portion of it is transferred from the poor to 
elites; or it could be that the average income of D’s less advantaged residents is held fixed and elites 
capture all the aggregate gains. 
 
29 Moellendorf (2002: 63), an Associative Duty Extender, also seems to take this position. He argues 
(among other things) that if market competition for jobs is justified among compatriots, then “it is hard 
to find a reason” why it would not be justified between compatriots and non-compatriots, even if it is 
true that immigration negatively impacts domestic workers (though he expresses doubts about the 
veracity of the latter empirical claim). 
30 The relative weight one gives to domestic equality might depend on the absolute levels of income of 
both the poorest domestic persons and the global poor. For example, one might treat income 
sufficiency as a more urgent concern than equality; hence, if (L,not-T) raises the global poor above 
sufficiency, that is a reason to favor (L,not-T) over Q, despite the fact that the former increases 
domestic inequality. We treat equality–sufficiency trade-offs in more detail in section 6. 
31 Although we note that Bounded Egalitarianism neither entails nor is entailed by the views of 
Associative Duty Extenders. 
32 Cf. Valentini (2012). 
33 Cf. Caney (2005: ch. 5). 
34  Gilabert (2011). 
35 The notion of “contribution” is a relatively elastic one, extending from clear-cut cases of doing harm to 
more complex cases of enabling harm, and these different kinds of contributions might be relevant to 
such discounting to different extents. See, for example, the discussion in Barry and Øverland (2012). 
36 See, for example, Thomson (1973); Butt (2007); Goodin (2013); and Barry and Wiens (2016). 
37 For now, we set aside the complication—raised by our introduction of Bounded Egalitarianism—in 
which concerns for global and domestic equality are weighted differently. This possibility permits 
concerns for equality in different spheres to be traded off against global sufficiency in different ways. 
We take up trade-offs between domestic equality and global sufficiency in more detail below. 
 
38 Notice that this question arises even if we relax our assumption that GW, the degree of global equality, 
decreases. We continue to assume that GD, the degree of domestic equality, decreases. 
39 For example, Nagel (2005). 
40 See Rawls (1971). 
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